This paper considers the situation in which a single indivisible object has to be allocated to one person out o( a group whose members all have equal rights to it. I)il(erent persous valur the object díf(emntly and each person only knowe his own value exactly. The question is who should get the object and by how much this person should compensate the others in order to guarantee a fair and efficient allocation. After having shown that several well-known methods perform unsatisfactory, we derive an impossibility theorem showing that some classical fair division methods cannot be implemented when there is incomplete information. Finally, we give examples of inechanisms that do guarantee fair and efficient outcomes. 
~: Mti~~R Discussion .~o.~.,~,,.. The problem of how to divide an indivisible object among a group of persons who all have equal rights to it arises, for example, in divorce settlements and in inheritance situations in which there are equivalent heirs but there is no will. In a business setting, the problem arises in the dissolving of joint ventures. In this paperl we will assume that side payments between the parties are possible and we will try to answer the queation of who should get the object and by how much each of the other players should be compensated in order to obtain (ex post) a fair and efficient allocation. Efficiency implies that the object should be allocated to the person who values is most. The fairness criterion we will employ is the one proposed in Foley (1967) : It is required that the final allocation be envy free, i.e. no player should envy another, each player should prefer what he himself receives above what any other player receives.
There exists an extensive literature on the fair division problem~. In this literature various concepts of fairncws havc bcrn proposcd and scvcral fair division methods, such as divide and choose, random allocation followed by bargaining, and suctioning the object followed by an equal division of the revenue, have been analyzed. In most of the literature, attention has been restricted to the case of complete information3. Frequently, however, it will be the case that each player, although he may know exactly how much he himself values the object, has only somewhat vague (probabilistic) information about his opponents' values. This opens up the possibility for strategic manipulation: A person might pretend that he values the object more (or less) than he actually does in order to obtain a more favorable outcome. Our aim in this paper is to atudy the consequences of such strategic behavior in fair division situations. Specifically we will investigate whether i Moet of the material in this paper ia taken from the unpubliahed working paper Van Damme (1985) .
For example Crawford (1977) , Crawford and Heller (1979) , Kuhn (1967) , Luce and Raiffa (1957, Chapter 14) , Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) , Samueleon (1980) , Steinhaus (1948) and Varian (1974) .
3Exceptions are Gutó (1986) , Guth and Van Damme (1986) and Lyon (1986) . In aome older papere it ia merely pointed out that the propoeed methode are vulnerable to atrategic manipulation, there ia no analyeie of ita consequencea Dubina (1977) has ahown that minmax atrategiea imply truthful revelation of valueein the Steinhaus procedure. it is possible to obtain fair and efficient outcomea when players use their private information strategically.
Recently, considerable attention has been devoted to the atudy of bargaining under asymmetric information'. In this context the conaequencea of etrategic behavior have been thoroughly investigated, and it has been shown that strategic behavior may prevent an ex post efficient outcome being reached. Although the insighta generated by the bargaining literature are highly relevant for the problem at hand (indeed we will make extensive use of them), there are at least two novel aspects in the fair division problem.
1~'irst of all we will scY~that division methoda that treat Lhe players asyrnmetrically aggravate the incentive problems. Methoda that preserve the symmetry of the playere are superior, they yield higher payoffs. As a consequence it is not desirable to reduce the division problem to a bargaining problem by first allocating the property rights. Secondly, in the bargaining literature, attention has been restricted to the efficiency aspect, yucstions of fairness Lavc not birn considcrcd.
It should be noted that in the more abstract (cooperative) papers on gamea with incomplete information by Harsanyi and Selten (1972) and Myerson (1979 Myerson ( , 1984 some of the axioms are based on equity considerations. However, these papers make the fundamental assumption that all that matters are the expected utilities at the interim stage, i.e. at the point in time where each player knows his own value but dces not yet know those of his opponents. In contrast, in the present study our interest is also in the point in time where all values have been revealed as we want to guarantee that ex post there is no envy. Hence, the crucial parameters for our study are the actual, ex post, utilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After having introduced some basic concepts in Section 2, we atudy, for the special case in which there are only two participants, some well-known division methods in Section 3. It is shown that methods that keep players in symmetric positions (such as auctions) outperíorm asymmetric diSee Kennan and Wilson (1990) for a recent survey.
vision methods (such as divide and choose), but that also suctions may yield outcomes that are not envy free. In Section 4 we show that all ex poet efficient mechanisma are equivalent at the interim stage (i.e. they generate the same expected utilities) and that random allocation is the worst possible mechanism. Section 5 ahowa that several`classical' fair division methoda cannot be implemented when there is incomplete information, and Section 6 gives an example of a mechanism that always generatea fair and efficient outcomes. Section 7 investigates whether poaitive reaulta can also be obtained if one requires that equilibria be in dominant strategies and Section 8 offers a brief conclusion.
The Division Problem
We consider a situation in which a single indivisible object has to be allocated to one
person from a group of n. All players have equal rights to the object, side paymenta are possible, and each player is risk neutral and has a utility function that is additively separable in money and the object. Hence, if player i's value of the object is v; and if t;
is the monetary transfer that this player pays, then his utility is u; -v; -t; if he geta the object while his utility is u; --t; if he doesn't get it. Each player's valuation is known privately, but it is common knowledge that all values are drawns independently from a distribution F with support (y, v] . We assume that the density f is positive and continuous and without loss of generality we take p-0 and v-1. Hence, each player indeed values the object.
The problem is to determine which player should geL the object and by how much 6e
should compensate his partners so aa Lo guarantee that the final allocation ia both fair and efficient. A mechanism is a game form specifying the allocation rulea. Formally, a mechanism is a tuple p -G A, p, t~, where A-A~x... x A" with A; being the (nonempty) set of pure atrategies of player i, bllence, we follow the seminal idea from Harsanyi (1967-8) to convert a situation with incomplete information to one with asymmetric information. Given the mechanism {~, a(pure) strategy for player i is a map a; : while the probability that he receives the object is (v) -p;(o(v) ) and t ';~(v) -t;~(o(v) ) is incentive compatible and leads to the same allocation. Hence, the restriction to incentive compatible direct mechanisms is without loss of generality. (This is the so-called revelation principle, see e.g. Myerson (1979) .) For an incentive compatible direct mechanism p, we simplify notation by writing P, (v;),T;(v;) and U;(v;) instead of Pa(v;),T,s(v;) and U; (v;; v;) , resp. where á denotes the atrategy of truthtelling (ó;(v;) -v; for all i).
We conclude this section by specifying three additional conditions that we want mechanisrns to satisfy. The requirements will be formulated only for direct mechanisms. An indirect mechanism p is said to satisfy the requirements if it has an equilibrium a which is such that the direct mechanism j~-p o a satisfies them. First of all, since ex ante the players are in symmetrical positions we want the mechanism to be symmetric, i.e. the 7 mechanism should be anonymous: The probability that a player gets the object should only depend on the vector of values and not on the player's name, and similarly for the transfers. In particular, symmetry implies that the functions P;, T; and U; do not depend on the player index i, hence, from now on, we will drop this index. Secondly, we want the allocation to be ex post efficient, i.e. the object should end up with a player who values it most, hence if p;(v) 1 0, then v; -v~(2.9)
A mechanism is ex post e~j' icient if it satisfies (2.9) for all v. Finally, we want all players to be satisfied with the final allocation, i.e. the final allocation should be envy jree (Foley where vh (resp. v') denotes the highest (resp. second higheat) value. A mechanism that generates an envy free allocation for each possible value vector, will be called an ez post Jair mechanism. The remainder of the paper is devoted to the question of whether such mechanisms exist and what their properties are.
Examples of Mechanisms
In this section several division methods that have been proposed in the literature will be illustrated. Attention will be confined to the case in which there are only two participants and in which F is the uniform distribution on [0,1].
A first procedure is random allocation: each player receives the object with probability 1~2 and there are no side payments. Clearly, this mechanism is very inefficient, in fact, the results of the next section imply that this mechanism yields the loweat expected utility for each player, no matter what his value might be. One method for improving the performance of this mechanism readily suggests itself, viz. let the random allocation be followed by bargaining between the partners. Since a player cannot be forced to trade if he doesn't want to, each player can only gain by engaging in the bargaining and, therefore, the expected payoffs will be higher. The final allocation (and, hence, the expected payoffs) will depend on how the rules for the bargaining game are specified.
For example, suppose that the rules are that simultaneously the buyer and the seller submit bids and that the object is transferred, for a price equal to the average of the bids, if and only if the buyer's bid exceeds that of the seller. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1982) have shown that this game has an equilibriume given by
hence, in the range where trade is possible, the seller overstatea his value while the buyer 6There exist other equilibria as well.
understates his, and this has the consequence that the outcome is not always ex post efficient. Straightforward computations show that the atrategies from (3.1) yield the expected utility function U given by
1~2v'f3~8v;~}1~64 if v;~3~4
The reader might think that by using a different bargaining procedure, the performance of this type of inechanism can be improved. However, it follows from the results of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) that, no matter what the rules are, there will always be combinations of valucs for which thc object ends up with the peraon who valuea it leasL. R.andom allocation followed by bargaining performs badly because playera are trcated asymmctri~~ally: Oncc thc init.ial prop~rty rights have been assigned, the partners have conElicting interests. In order to get a better price, the seller pretends that the object is worth more to him than it actually is while the buyer understates his value; strategic behavior which implies that the players may fail to strike an efficient bargain.
These incentives for strategic manipulation can be reduced by forcing the players to announce their bids before the object is allocated; if a player doesn't know whether he will be the buyer or the sellet, then his bid will be closer to the actual value.' Formally, one may proceed as follows. The players are asked to simultaneously submit bida bl and 6~, and then the object is randomly allocated. If the random move assigns the object to player i, then player i may retain the object if b;~6" otherwise he aella it to player j for the price p-(6; f b~)~2. Because of risk neutrality, this mechanism is equivalent to the auction mechanism in which the players bid and the object is allocated to the highest bidder who pays his partner a compensation of p-(b~t bz)~4. This auction mechanism will be analyzed at the end of this section (it corresponds to Lhe auction with 1-1~2) and we will see that the expected utilities generated by this mechanism dominate thoaẽ Thie argument haa aleo been made in Samuelson ( 1985) . That paper also diecuseed the a-auction mechaniem with a -1~2.
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given by (3.2).
Another mechanism that may be used is the divide and choose method, specifically the variant of this method that has been proposed in Luce and Raiffa (1957) . Each person adds 1(perfectly divisible) money unit to the pot, then a random move determinea who will be the divider, this divider transfers a certain amount x from the pot to the object and his partner has the choice between the object plus x or the remainder, 2- 
v~-1~4 if v~? 3~4
It is interesting to note that U~(v;)~Ud(v;) for alI v;, hence, the method favors the chooser. This is in sharp contrast to the case in which the values are perfectly known.
In the latter case, the method favors the divider, he can extract all the surplus. Also note that, under incomplete information, the object ends up with the chooser if and only if v~1 1~4 f vd~2, hence, also this method may lead to an inefFicient allocation.
Again thc rcason is stratcgic manipulation: If vd is amall ( resp. large), then the divider is tempted to transfer relatively little ( resp. relatively much) to the object, and if the chooser's value is below ( resp. above) average,then the chooser takea the alternative that the divider doean't "expect" and an inefficient outcome results.
The cause of the inefFiciency associated with the divide and choose method is again the fact that players are in asymmetric roles. It is better not to introduce roles and keep th~~nyium~~try. 'I'hi~m am varioux poaaibiliti~~s for mudifying thc method in Lhia way. We now discusa two of these, both based on ideas of Banach and Knaster as reported in Steinhaus (1948) . The essential idea is to let the division be performed by a mediator.
For example, Lhe mediator continuously transfers money [rom Lhe pot to the object until one of the players shouts`stop'. This player then receives the object plus the money that has been transferred, his partner receives the remainder of the money. It is clear that this mechanism is actually an auction mechanism. If we write s; -1 f b;~2 for the value of the pot at which player i shouts`stop', and interpret b; as player i's bid, then the highest bidder gets the object and he pays his partner a price equal to half of his bid.
(Hence, this is the special case of the auction mechanism introduced below with a-1.)
Alternatively, the mediator may first add all money to the object and then continuously transfer money from the object to the pot. In this case the person who first shoutà stop' receives the pot, his partner receives the object plus the remaindec of the money.
Again this mechanism is actually an auction mechanism. If player i shouts`stop' when the amount that has been transferred to the pot is s; and we write s; -1 f 6;~2 then (with 6; being the bid of player i) the highest bidder gets the object and he pays this partner a price equal to half of the bid that the partner made. (Hence, this is the special case of the auction mechanism introduced next with a-0.)
Generally, an auction mechanism may be deacribed as follows. Simultaneously the 1`L players bid and the object is allocated to the highest bidder for a price of~times the Hence, the expected payoffs are independent of a, a fact that is explained by the resulta of Sect. 4. The reader also notes that in terms of expected utilities the auction mechanisms indeed dominate random allocation followed by bargaining (the RHS from (3.6) is alwaya strictly larger than that of (3.2)) as well as the divide and choose method (if U is as in Oue notes that Lhis transfer cannot alwaye lie between v~~2 and v~~2 so that no auction dln Van Damme (1984) it wae ehown that theee propertiee hold for any number o[ playere, n, and for any dietribution F.
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mcchanísm is ex post fair.
The following two conclusions emerge from these examples. Mechanisms that have players play different roles typica.lly lead to inefficient outcomes. Symmetric mechaniams have better efficiency properties, but also these mechanisms may yield outcomes that are not ex post fair. In the Sections 6 and 7 we will describe mechanisms that are ex post fair. In Sect. 4 we explain why all auction mechanisms are equivalent at the interim stage.
Revenue Equivalence
In this section we derive a`revenue equivalence theorem' that explains why all auction mechanisms are equivalent at the interim stage. From now on attention will be restricted to direct mechanisms. By the revelation principle, this is without loss of generality.
We start by giving a characterization of incentive compatibility.
Recall that a direct mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. if for all i and all v;, w; E[0,1] v;P(v;) -T(v;) 1 v;P(w;) -T(w;) (4.1)
where P and T are defined by (2.5) and (2.6) and by the temarks concerning notation that were made after (2.8). The proof of Lemma 1 is standard and follows ideas outlined in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) . (See also Cramton et al. (1987) .) To make the paper self-contained, however, the proof is given in the appendix. 
Lemma 1 . A direct mechanism te is incentive compatióle if and only if P is nondecreasing and T is related to P according to T(2'r) -T(fi) f f u xdP(x)
(T(0) -f 1(1 -F(x) -xÍ(x))P(x)dx, 0 hencethat
U(v;) -I~(F(x)~xf(x) -1)P(x)dx t~v~P(x)dx (4.4)
For ex post efHcient mechanisms, this expression can be rewritten as
U(v;) -n-} n n 1 f~F"(x)dx -f r F"-1(x)dx f f v F"-r(x)dx (4.5)
Let us remark that the constant term U(0) in Eq. (4.5) is equal to (l~n)th of the expected revenue generated when the objectis auctioned,say by the Vickrey procedure (or indeed by any auction procedure that always allocates the object to the person who values it most). We return to this property in Section 7. The following proposition summarizes the results obtained thus far Proposition 1 . The expected utility Junction U associated with an incentive compatible mechanism depends only on ihe probability junction P and is given by (~.
4). For ex post e,~cient mechanisms, P(x) -F(x)"'t and then !he expected utility Junction is given 6y
(4.5). Proposition 2. Every mechanism is (weaklyJ preJerred to random allocation, i.e.
Note that Lemma
U(v;) 1 v;~n for any incentive compatióle mechanism.
Proof. See the appendix.
From now on attention will be restricted to ex post efficient mechanisms. The following Proposition, which states that ex ante efFiciency is equivalent to ex post efficiency, provides an additional justification for this restriction. Namely the proposition implies that there dces not exist a mechanism that is uniformly preferred above an ex post efficient mechanism. A mechanism is said to be ex ante efHcient if it maximizes the ex ante 
f v;P(v;)dF(v;) -n f v;p;(v)dF(v) -1~v;p;(v)dF(v) c 1 v"~p;(v)dF(v)-J v"dF(v) -n f U"(v;)dF(v;)
Since the inequality in the above chain is strict unless ( 2.9) is satisfied for almost all v, the proof is complete.5
An Impossibility Theorem
In this section we turn to some resolutions of the fair division problem that have been proposed in the literature for the case in which the value vector is commonly known, and we will show that the allocations corresponding to these procedures cannot be implemented when there is incomplete information about the players' values.
A fair division method is a mapping m that assigns to each value vector v a utility u;"(v) for each player i. For an incentive compatible direct mechanism~t let us write 9Such a mechanism indeed exiate: In Van Damme (1989) it wae ehown that the a-suction methode diecuseed in Section 3 have thie property. Cramton et al. (1987) have ehown that, more generally, ex poet efTicirnt~nechaniemx exixt if and only if the initial dietribution of ownenhip share~i~not~too aeymmetri c" .
u"(v) for the utility that player i gets from p when the value vector is v(assuming, of
course, that the truthtelling equilibrium is played in p). Hence u"(v) -v;p;(v) -t;(v).
We say that the [air division method m can be implementad if there exiets an incentive compatible mechanism {r with u; (v) -u;"(v) for all i and v. We will show that neither the Steinhaus division method (Steinhaus (1948) ), nor the egalitarian division can be implemented in case there is incomplete information. Since both methods can be obtained by applying the Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950) ) resulting from an appropriately chosen threat point, we turn to the Nash bargaining solution first.
Assume Lyon (1986) has shown that this auction mechanism has a symmetric, increasing equilibrium. Hence, this mechanism is also ex post efficient and the interim expected payoffs are given by (4.5). In the case of 2 players these niles correspond to those of the auction mechanism from Section 3 with a-1~2, hence, the final outcome need not be fair.
A Possibility Theorem
In this section we show that it is possible to ensure that the final allocation will be envy free by giving an example of a mechanism leading to fair allocations.
Proposition 5. There exists an incentive compatib(e, ex post jair mechanism.
Proof: For a value vector v E R" let v~be the highest component of v and let v' be the second highest component of v. Consider the following direct mechanism: The object is allocated to the person with the highest value, he paye the amount
to each of his partners. In case there are multiple, say k, playera with the highest value then each of them receives the object with probability l~k and the person getting the object pays each of his partners vti~n.
Clearly, thia mechanism treats the players symmetrically. Furthermore, the amount that the winner pays to cach of his partners lica inbetween v'~n and vti~n eo that the mechanism is ex post fair. It remains to verify that the mechanism is incentive compatible, i.e. that truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium. Since the mechanism is ex post efficient, it suffices, by Lemma 1, to show that the expected transfer payments satisfy
The verification of this identity involves straightforward calculations which are carried out in the appendix. O Note that, since the mechanism from Proposition 5 is a direct mechaniam, it is context dependent, i.e. the rules of the mechanism directly depend on the characteristic~of the underlying uncertainty, i.e. the mechanism depends on the distribution function F.
The author has not succeeded in finding a context independent mechanism of whicó the equilibrium gives rise to the direct mechanism from Proposition 5. It should also be notc~d that the mechanism described in (6.1) is probably not the unique ex post fair mechanism, however, in a certain sense it is the simplest one possible. Namely, it is the unique ex post fair mechanism for which the transfers depend only on v~and v' and for which 8t(vh, v') is independent of v', and avh 8t (vh,v' ) is independent of vh.
av' (If inediators are risk neutral and if the market for mediators is competitive, the players will indeed be able to find a mediator who is willing to play this role.) By reviewing the proof of Proposition 1, one sees that condition (2.3) is not essential for this result to hold, the proof just uses (4.3). Hence, if the mediator has zero expected profits, then (in an incentive compatible mechanism) the player's expected utilities are still given by An alt,errrative possibility is that the mediator uses the information revealed by the auction to determine the compensation of the loosers rather than to determine the price that the winner should pay. Specifically, the mediator may use the following procedure. Clearly, the mechanisms discussed in this section are viable only if the mediator is able to make an accurate assessment of the value of the object, i.e. if he knows the diatribution F. It will also be clear that even if he knows F, he will be reluctant to use the second procedure discussed above. Namely, although truthteling is a dominant atrategy in the game, the mediator should fear that the agents will try to increase their payoffs by more sophisticated ways of manipulating the outcome. For example, the players could make a secret contract that each player will bid his value plus an amount x and that each looser will pay the winner x~n. With this contract in place it is a dominant strategy for each player i to bid v; -} x in the mediator's auction game. Compared with the original situation in which there is no contract each player increases his payoff by (n -1)x~n, at the expense of the mediator who makea an expected loss of (n -1)x. Hence, it is very unlikely that we will observe such a mechanism in practice.
Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated a simple fair division situation with incomplete information. The analysis was simplified by the assumptions of symmetry (all values are drawn from the same distribution) and independence (all valuea are drawn independently). Further research should be devoted to relaxing these assumption. The assumption of independence seems especially inappropriate in the case of the dissolving of joint ventures, one of the examples that was mentioned in the Introduction. In that case the value of each partner depends on the future prospects for the businesa about which the partners may have different information.
The paper was motivated by the idea that it is desirable to guarantee an ex post fair outcome. It may be questioned whether ex post fairness is indeed desirable, especially since some types of a player may, at the interim stage, prefer non-fair mechaniams above fair onesto. In Van Damme (1985) it was shown that, for the example discuased iñ aWhy thie ie ao cao easily be seen in an asymmetric example. Suppoee that player 1 values the object at vl -0 and that player 2 valuea the object either at v~-0(with probability p) or at v~-100 (with probability 1-p). In an ex poat fair incentive compatible mechanism, player 2 always gete the object and he pays at moat 5 for it. If p ie sufficiently small player 1 clearly prefers a mechaniem in which the object is allocated only to player 2 íf thie player ie willing to pay a eufficiently high price for it.
Section 3, the expected utility for a player with value 1~2 is maximi2ed by a mechaniam that assigne the object to the person with the highest value when thia value ie not in the interval [1~4,3~4] and that allocates the object randomly if the highest value is in this interval. In that paper it was also shown that only a type with value v; -0 or v; -1 prefers an ex post fair mechanism above any other mechanism. If one doea not ineist on ex post efficiency, then the allocation mechaniam ehould reflect a fair compromise between the alternative types of a player~r and the aolutions of Harsanyi and Selten (1972) and Myerson (1984) 
